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PRESSURE ON THE TRIGGER WILL NOW FIRE THE
WEAPON1
AN EXAMINATION OF HOW THE SUPREME COURT,
CONGRESS, AND PRESIDENTS HAVE LEFT THE LEGAL
FOUNDATION FOR EXECUTIVE DETENTION AKIN TO THE
WORLD WAR II ERA INTERNMENT OF JAPANESE
AMERICANS LARGELY INTACT
Kevan F. Jacobson*

1

The title is drawn from language commonly found in small arms training materials. It refers to the fact
that once all other steps necessary to place a weapon in a state of readiness to fire have been taken, pressing
the trigger will cause the weapon to discharge the ammunition with which it has been loaded. See, e.g.,
Defensive Shooting: Part 4 – Trigger Manipulation, Recovery, and Follow-Through, SPARTAN FIREARMS
TRAINING GROUP, LLC (Sept. 15, 2018), https://www.spartanfirearmstraininggroup.com/defensiveshooting-part-4-trigger-manipulation-recovery-and-follow-through/.

* Kevan F. Jacobson is currently the Chair of the Political Science and
Criminal Justice Department at Southern Utah University. He teaches
classes in substantive and procedural criminal law as well as courses related to national security and American government. Professor Jacobson
is a retired U.S. Army officer who spent over 30 years as a lawyer in the
Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He served around the world as a tactical, operational, and strategic levels in both peace and war, practicing
across a broad and diverse spectrum of federal, military, and international law. He holds degrees from Utah State University, B.A. (Political
Science), 1981; the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, J.D., 1984; The Judge Advocate General’s School, LL.M. 1992;
and the U.S. Army War College, Masters of Strategic Studies, 2006. He
has been a member of the Utah State Bar since 1984.
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ABSTRACT
Contrary to Chief Justice Robert's dicta, Trump v. Hawaii (2018) did not
overrule Korematsu v. United States (1944) which upheld the exclusion of
Japanese Americans from the West Coast during World War II. Korematsu
and its related cases are still troublingly vital. Their expansive reading of the
war powers justifying executive detention has been bolstered by the Court's
cases addressing detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
(2004), which sanctioned the detention of a U.S. citizen pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, exposed a fundamental weakness
in the Non-Detention Act, the principal statutory barrier to executive detention. Today, despite the appalling history of the World War II era internment
of Japanese Americans, the authority of the President to employ preventive
executive detention remains both remarkably intact and remarkably broad.
That authority should be restrained by appropriate amendments to the NonDetention Act.
INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2018, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Trump v. Hawaii.2 The case challenged President Donald J. Trump’s authority to impose selected conditions upon the entry into the U.S. by nationals of
eight named foreign nations. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion which upheld the President’s authority to impose such conditions.3 In doing so, the Chief Justice briefly addressed a reference by the dissent to Korematsu v. United States,4 one of four now ill-famed World War II
era Supreme Court cases which dealt with the treatment of Japanese Americans and others of Japanese ancestry who were subject to exclusion and evacuation from the West Coast of the U.S. and subsequent internment during
war. In pertinent part, the Chief Justice wrote:
Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has
nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful
and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that
morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission . . . The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious:

2

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
Id. at 2415.
4 Id. at 2423; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
3
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Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the
5
court of history, and— to be clear— has no place in law under the Constitution.

On the heels of the decision in Trump, media outlets rushed to announce
that Korematsu had at long last been reversed.6 But as the Chief Justice wrote,
Korematsu truthfully had nothing to do with the Trump case. In fact, Korematsu never addressed “[t]he forcible relocation of U.S. citizens” to camps,
a matter the Court expressly recognized when it decided that case.7 However
gratifying the Chief Justice’s remarks were, they were dicta;8 stirring, hopeful, and encouraging, but dicta, nonetheless. Accordingly, Korematsu and its
fellow travelers, live on.
This paper briefly examines the history of the exclusion, evacuation, and
internment of 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry by the U.S. during World
War II. It analyzes three U.S. Supreme Court cases which addressed aspects
of those measures along with subsequent Congressional actions designed, at
least in part, to avoid a repetition of such deprivations of liberty. It explains
how these developments have left the legal authority for potential broad scale
wartime executive detentions largely intact, raising the troubling prospect of
a repetition of our unhappy history should time and circumstances again provoke aggressive reactions to perceived existential national threats. It concludes with a recommendation for legislation which could erect a better bulwark against unjust executive detention in times of war or another dire
national emergency.
I. Historical Background
At 7:55 a.m. on Sunday, December 7, 1941, airplanes launched from aircraft carriers of the Imperial Japanese Navy appeared in the skies above Pearl
Harbor located on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.9 Within the following two
5

Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
6 See Charlie Savage, Korematsu, Notorious Supreme Court Ruling on Japanese Internment, Is Finally
Tossed Out, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/korematsu-supremecourt-ruling.html.
7 Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. Korematsu addressed the lawfulness of an order issued by military authorities
which excluded the appellant from a specified area - which included his home. It did not address the
lawfulness of other measures, including internment in a relocation center. As Justice Black wrote: “Since
the petitioner has not been convicted of failing to report or to remain in an assembly or relocation center,
we cannot in this case determine the validity of those separate provisions of the order. It is sufficient here
for us to pass upon the order which petitioner violated. To do more would be to go beyond the issues
raised, and to decide momentous questions not contained within the framework of the pleadings or the
evidence in this case.” Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222.
8 Dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A judicial comment made while delivering a
judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential
(although it may be considered persuasive).”).
9 Remembering Pearl Harbor, A Pearl Harbor Fact Sheet, CENSUS.GOV,
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hours, Japanese airmen killed “2,403 U.S. personnel…and destroyed or damaged 19 U.S. Navy ships, including 8 battleships.”10 The attack shocked the
nation and “aroused the people of the United States as no other event in their
history ever had.”11 The people “reeled with a . . . staggering mixture of surprise . . . grief, humiliation, and, above all, cataclysmic fury.”12 Within a day,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress to declare war against Japan.13 Congress passed a Joint Resolution to that effect on December 8.14
Rumors of Japanese “fifth column” activities, which were alleged to have
facilitated the attack, spread broadly in Hawaii.15 They found receptive ears
on the West Coast of the U.S. where they proved “particular[ly] [influential]
in the formulation of public attitudes[.]”16 Wary of sabotage and “[f]earing
an invasion of the continent,” citizens, media representatives, members of
Congress, and military leaders began to advocate for “strong precautionary
measures” including “‘the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese
lineage’ and other ‘dangerous’ persons from California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska.”17
In this highly charged environment, President Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 9066 on February 19, 1942.18 Citing the need to provide “every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage” the President authorized “the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may . . .
designate . . . to prescribe military areas . . . from which any or all persons
may be excluded[.]”19 Contrary to long-standing public perception, Executive Order 9066 was not explicitly directed at persons of Japanese ancestry.20
As implemented, however, most of those the order would impact were of

https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/pearl-harbor-fact-sheet-1.pdf 1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
10 Id.
11 GORDON W. PRANGE, AT DAWN WE SLEPT, THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR 582 (1981).
12 Id.
13 Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, The President Requests War Declaration 125:
December 7, 1941 A Date Which Will Live in Infamy, Address to the Congress Asking That a State of
War Be Declared Between the United States and Japan (Dec. 8, 1941) (transcript available in the Library
of Congress).
14 S.J. Res. 116, 77th Cong. (1941).
15 PRANGE, supra note 11, at 561.
16 Leonard J. Arrington, The Price of Prejudice 4 (Utah State Univ., Working Paper 23, 1962).
17 Id.
18 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
19 Id.
20 See id.
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Japanese descent and they were clearly intended to be the primary focus.21
Approximately 70,000 of these were native born citizens of the U.S..22
On February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, designated
Lieutenant General John L. Dewitt, Commanding General, Western Defense
Command and Fourth Army, “as the Military Commander to carry out the
duties and responsibilities imposed by . . . Executive Order [9066] for that
portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command . . .
as [deemed] proper to prescribe.”23 This designation effectively delegated a
material degree of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief of the
Army to General Dewitt. 24
General Dewitt promptly began to exercise his delegated authority; by
proclamations on March 2 and 16, 1942, he established “military areas”
within the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona.25 He further established “restricted” and “prohibited” zones within the military areas.26
On March 18, 1942, the President issued Executive Order Number 9102,27
which established the War Relocation Authority (the “WRA”), an executive
agency which the order charged with “provid[ing] for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security.”28
General Dewitt issued the first of a series of “Civilian Exclusion Orders”
on March 24, 1942.29 Each order prohibited persons of Japanese ancestry
from remaining within designated boundaries encompassed by military areas
and directed them to be processed through so called “control stations” and
“assembly centers,” thereafter to be evacuated and face indefinite internment
in so called “relocation centers.”30 By November 1942, approximately
110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry residing in designated military areas
had been subjected to the exclusion procedure and interned, pending

21

See J.L. DEWITT, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942, at vii-viii (U.S.
Gov’t Printing Off. 1943).
22 Japanese-American Internment During World War II, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/japanese-relocation (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
23 See DEWITT, supra note 21, at 25−26.
24 See id. at 25; see generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (describing the commander-in-chief power of
the president).
25 See DEWITT, supra note 21, at 32.
26 See id.
27 Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (Mar. 20, 1942).
28 Id.
29 DEWITT, supra note 21, at 114.
30 Id.
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resettlement elsewhere, in one of ten relocation centers distributed across the
continental U.S..31
While these actions were underway, on March 21, 1942, Congress provided criminal penalties against persons who chose to violate exclusion orders or their attendant regulations.32 Anyone who should “enter, remain in,
leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone . . . contrary to
the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone . . . [was] guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction [was] liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000
or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both[.]”33
Between the military orders issued pursuant to the delegation of Presidential powers and the penalties for their violation established by Congress, the
stage was set for litigation which would test their validity before the U.S.
Supreme Court.
II. The Supreme Court Addresses Exclusion, Evacuation, Relocation,
and Internment
Four U.S. citizens eventually contested aspects of the exclusion, evacuation, relocation, and internment process in the courts. The Supreme Court
ultimately reviewed each case and issued opinions between June 1943 and
December 1944. Hirabayashi v. United States34 and Yasui v. United States,35
were companion cases, both of which addressed convictions for violating
curfews to which the appellants had been subjected.36 Korematsu v. United
States37 examined the constitutionality of a civilian exclusion order, of which
the appellant was convicted of violating.38 Lastly, Ex parte Endo39 considered whether Endo, a concededly loyal citizen, could be required to comply
with an administrative leave procedure as a condition of release from a relocation center.40

31

See id. at 279, 282−84.
Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.
33 Id.
34 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83−84 (1943).
35 Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115, 116 (1943). As a companion case, the Court’s opinion in Yasui
did little more than sustain Yasui’s conviction on the same grounds as it elaborated extensively in Hirabayashi and hence will not be explored further herein.
36 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83; Yasui, 320 U.S. at 116.
37 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
38 Id. at 215.
39 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
40 Id. at 293−95.
32
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A. Hirabayashi v. United States
In the spring of 1942, Kiyoshi Hirabayashi was living in Seattle, Washington.41 On March 24, 1942, General Dewitt issued Public Proclamation No.
3,42 providing that as of March 27, 1942, “all persons of Japanese ancestry
residing or being within the geographical limits of Military Area No. 1…shall
be within their place of residence between the [curfew] hours of 8:00 P.M.
and 6:00 A.M.[.]”43 Acting pursuant to his belief that he would be waiving
his rights as a citizen should he comply, Mr. Hirabayashi chose to be “away
from his residence after 8 p.m. on May 9, 1942.”44 He was subsequently indicted, tried in U.S. District Court, and convicted for violating the act of
March 21, 1942.45 He was sentenced to confinement for three months.46 Before the Supreme Court, Mr. Hirabayashi asserted that “Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to [General Dewitt] by authorizing
him to impose the [curfew], and that, even if the regulation were in other
respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth Amendment prohibit[ed] the discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and those of other ancestry.”47
The Court emphasized that the issues must be considered in the light of
the “conditions [prevailing] in the early months of 1942.”48 Allowing that
many matters “were then peculiarly within the knowledge of military authorities,”49 the Court observed that it was known that Japan “had gained a naval
superiority . . . in the Pacific which might enable them to seize Pearl Harbor,
our largest naval base and the last stronghold of defense lying between Japan
and the west coast.”50 In light of these circumstances, the Court was content
“[t]hat reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of our national defense had ample ground for concluding that they must face the

41

Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 88.
Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Mar. 24, 1942).
43 320 U.S. at 88.
44 Id. at 84.
45 Id. at 83.
46 Id. at 84. Hirabayashi was also convicted of a violation of the March 21 act for having failed to report
to a Civil Control Station as had been mandated by Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57, 7 Fed. Reg. 3725
(1942), which General Dewitt issued on May 10, 1942. He was sentenced to a concurrent term of 3 months
confinement for that offense. Since the Court ultimately found no “constitutional infirmity” regarding the
curfew violation, and since the sentences ran concurrently, the Court declined to consider issues associated
with the failure to report to a control station. Id. at 85, 105.
47 Id. at 89.
48 Id. at 93.
49 Id. at 94.
50 Id.
42
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danger of invasion, take measures against it, and in making the choice of
measures consider our internal situation, cannot be doubted.”51
As to Mr. Hirabayashi’s claim of unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power, the Court noted that in issuing Executive Order 9066, the President
did so in time of war and for the “declared purpose of prosecuting the war by
protecting national defense resources from sabotage and espionage.”52 When
General Dewitt issued proclamations pursuant to the Order, he “recited that
the entire Pacific Coast ‘by its geographical location is particularly subject to
attack, to attempted invasion…espionage and acts of sabotage, thereby requiring the adoption of military measures necessary to establish safeguards
against such enemy operations[.]’”53 The Court also noted that the Secretary
of War helped instigate the March Act via letters he wrote to Congressional
leaders wherein he recommended that Congress “provide means for the enforcement of orders issued under Executive Order No. 9066.”54 The Secretary also conveyed General Dewitt’s opinion that any act “‘should be broad
enough to enable the [enforcement of] curfews . . . within military areas and
zones[.]’”55 Congressional Committee reports and Senate floor speeches all
explicitly acknowledged that the Act was intended as a means to enforce curfews.56 Given this sequence of events, the Court said that “[t]he conclusion
is inescapable that Congress, by the Act of March 21, 1942, ratified and confirmed Executive Order No. 9066” and that “so far as it lawfully could, Congress authorized and implemented such curfew orders as the commanding
officer should promulgate pursuant to the Executive Order of the President.”57
In the Court’s view, the real issue was “not one of Congressional power to
delegate to the President the promulgation of the Executive Order, but
whether, acting in cooperation, Congress and the Executive have constitutional authority to impose the curfew[.]”58 Yet further refined, the issues were
whether, acting together, Congress and the Executive could leave it to the designated military commander to appraise the relevant conditions and on the basis of
that appraisal . . . promulgat[e] . . . the curfew order and whether the order itself
was an appropriate means of carrying out the Executive Order for the 'protection

51

Id.
Id. at 92.
53 Id. at 86.
54 Id. at 89.
55 Id. at 90.
56 See id.
57 Id. at 91.
58 Id. at 91−92.
52
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against espionage and against sabotage' to national defense materials, premises
59
and utilities.

The Court answered these questions in the affirmative through reliance
upon war powers the Constitution vests in the Executive and Legislative
branches. Of those powers, the Court said:
The war power of the national government is ‘the power to wage war successfully.’ It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to
affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of
victories in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase
of the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend the rise,
60
prosecution and progress of war.

In deference to the political branches, the Court said that the Constitution
grants them:
wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in determining the nature
and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the means
for resisting it [and that]…[w]here…conditions call for the exercise of judgment
and discretion…by those branches …it is not for any court to sit in review of the
61
wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.

Concluding that the President and Congress had acted together, the Court
held that “it was within the constitutional power of Congress and the executive arm of the Government to prescribe [the] curfew order . . . and that its
promulgation by the military commander involved no unlawful delegation of
legislative power.”62
The degree of the Court’s deference— and the bases upon which it supposed that the President, Congress, and military leaders had acted— were
further revealed in the Court’s treatment of Mr. Hirabayashi’s assertion that
the curfew unlawfully discriminated against citizens of Japanese ancestry.63
First, the Court noted that the coastal regions comprising the relevant military
areas contained vast numbers of military installations and defense industrial
facilities, including production facilities for ships and aircraft.64 Second, the
danger of sabotage and espionage in the area was obvious and espionage by
“persons with sympathy with the Japanese Government” was believed “to
have been particularly effective in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.”65
59

Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 92.
63 Id. at 82, 94−95.
64 See id. at 95 (noting that approximately one-fourth of U.S. aircraft production occurred in California
alone).
65 Id. at 96.
60
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The Court then went on to indulge an exercise in generalized suspicion of
the loyalty of persons of Japanese descent. The Court boldly asserted that
“[t]here [was] support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have prevailed since the close of the last century . . . have intensified [Japanese ethnic] solidarity and have in large measure prevented . . .
assimilation as an integral part of the [general] population.”66 The Court was
satisfied that “Congress and the Executive could reasonably have concluded
that [such] conditions have encouraged the continued attachment of members
of this group to Japan and Japanese institutions” and that the conditions could
be taken into consideration “by those charged with the responsibility for the
national defense . . . in determining the nature and extent of the danger of
espionage and sabotage, in the event of invasion or air raid attack.”67 The
heart of the matter came down to the following:
Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the
citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that
population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did
not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken
68
to guard against it.

The Court readily acknowledged the due process and equal protection implications of a curfew based on racial/ancestral distinctions. As it stated:
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to . . . doctrine[s] of equality. For that reason, legislative
classification or discrimination based on race alone has often been held to be
a denial of equal protection.”69 But in the Court’s eye, the ultimate question
to be decided was “whether, in the light of all the relevant circumstances preceding and attending their promulgation, the challenged orders and statute
afforded a reasonable basis for the action taken in imposing the curfew.”70
Ultimately, the Court answered that question and held:
We decide only the issue as we have defined it—we decide only that the curfew
order as applied, and at the time it was applied, was within the boundaries of the
war power. In this case it is enough that circumstances within the knowledge of
those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense

66

Id.
Id. at 98−99.
68 Id. at 99.
69 Id. at 100.
70 Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
67
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afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made. Whether we would
71
have made it is irrelevant.

Having found no constitutional infirmity in Kiyoshi Hirabayashi’s conviction, the Court let it stand.72
B. Korematsu v. United States
Fred Korematsu faced prosecution for a violation of the act of March 21,
1942 at about the same time as did Hirabayashi. Mr. Korematsu was a resident of San Leandro, California at the outbreak of war.73 On May 3, 1942,
General Dewitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order 34 which excluded persons
of Japanese ancestry from San Leandro beginning a mere 5 days later, specifically by 12 noon on May 8, 1942.74 Mr. Korematsu elected not to leave
San Leandro and was found there on or about May 30, 1942.75 Charged with
remaining in an area from which he was, by order, excluded, Mr. Korematsu
was tried in U.S. District Court where he stipulated that he had knowingly
violated the order.76 He was convicted with his sentence being suspended
during a five year period of probation.77 When his case reached the Supreme
Court, Mr. Korematsu “challenge[d] the assumptions upon which [the Court
rested its] conclusions in the Hirabayashi case.”78 He argued that by the time
General Dewitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order Number 34, there was no
longer any real threat of a Japanese invasion.79
The Court accepted that “exclusion from the area in which one's home is
located is a far greater deprivation than [the] constant confinement to [one’s]
home” during specified hours.80 But the Court quickly found Hirabayashi
dispositive as to the more significant deprivation of liberty.81
The Court recognized from the outset that “legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect” and that
“courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”82 Justice Black, who
wrote the Court’s opinion, thus suggested that the Court would apply a more
exacting standard than the “reasonable” or “rational” basis Chief Justice
71

Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
Id. at 105.
73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 226 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 229.
75 Id. at 220 (majority opinion).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 230 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 218 (majority opinion).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 218−19.
82 Id. at 216.
72
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Stone articulated in the majority opinion in Hirabayashi.83 He reinforced that
suggestion by observing that “[n]othing short of apprehension by the proper
military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can
constitutionally justify either” curfew or exclusion.84 Having thus arguably
set a higher standard, Justice Black indicated it could be met provided that
constraints bore “a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage.”85
Whatever degree of scrutiny Justice Black thought necessary, the Court
was convinced that the exclusion measures were lawful. As it had with regard
to the curfew in Hirabayashi, the Court “could not reject the finding of the
military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal” and thus “temporary exclusion of the
entire group” was permissible.86 Finding that it was “unable to conclude that
it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did[,]”87
the Court went on to “uphold the exclusion order as of the time it was made
and when the petitioner violated it.”88
Mr. Korematsu further urged the Court to determine whether detention in
an assembly center or relocation center, subsequent to exclusion, would constitute an unlawful deprivation of liberty.89 He argued that “the validity of
the exclusion order cannot be considered apart from the orders requiring him,
after departure from the area, to report and to remain in an assembly or relocation center.”90 Mr. Korematsu, however, had been convicted solely of violating an exclusion order.91 Accordingly, the Court declined to “go beyond
the issues raised, and to decide momentous questions not contained within
the framework of the pleadings or the evidence in [the] case.”92
Thus, Korematsu “deal[t] specifically with nothing but an exclusion order.”93 Though the court affirmed Fred Korematsu’s conviction,94 it

83

See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94, 102 (1943).
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 219.
87 Id. at 217−18.
88 Id. at 219.
89 See id. at 221.
90 See id.
91 Id. at 215−16.
92 Id. at 222.
93 Id. at 223.
94 Id. at 224.
84
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addressed the essence of the other issues he raised in the Endo case which it
decided the same day.
C. Ex parte Endo
Mitsuye Endo was living in Sacramento, California in early 1942.95 Pursuant to Civilian Exclusion Order Number 52,96 which General Dewitt issued
on May 7, 1942, Ms. Endo was required to leave Sacramento by midday May
16.97 Unlike Hirabayashi and Korematsu, she submitted to the order.98 She
was first sent to an assembly center in Sacramento and thereafter to the Tule
Lake Relocation Center in California, arriving there on June 19, 1942.99 She
was transferred to the Central Utah Relocation Center (Topaz) in the late
summer of 1943.100
Endo’s detention at the various centers was administered under the auspices of the WRA.101 On May 19, 1942, General Dewitt issued Civilian Restriction Order Number 1.102 The order provided that persons then residing
in centers were “required to remain within the bounds of … center[s] at all
times unless specifically authorized to leave” by Headquarters, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.103 The order further provided that violators were subject to “the penalties and liabilities provided by law.”104 On
August 11, 1942, General Dewitt delegated authority to WRA officials to
permit persons to depart centers.105 The WRA subsequently developed a detailed process by which those detained in centers could first apply to be
cleared to leave, and once granted such clearance, could apply for indefinite
leave in order to live and work elsewhere.106
While Endo ultimately applied for leave clearance,107 she did not, in the
meantime, rest upon her rights. She challenged the lawfulness of her detention by petition for a writ of habeas corpus which she filed in federal court in

95

Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 284−85 (1944).
Civilian Exclusion Order Number 52, 7 Fed. Reg. 3559 (May 13, 1942).
97 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 288.
98 See id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 285.
101 Id. at 290.
102 See Civilian Restrictive Order 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (Jan. 21, 1943).
103 Id.
104 Id. The relevant law was the Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173. See also Ex parte Endo, 323
U.S. at 289.
105 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 290.
106 See id. at 291−93.
107 Id. at 293−94. Endo applied for leave clearance on February 19, 1943 and was granted clearance on
August 16 of that year. She did not thereafter apply for leave.
96
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July 1942.108 She requested that “she be discharged and restored to liberty.”109 The District Court denied her request a year later.110 Endo’s case
finally reached the Supreme Court in May 1944—nearly two years after she
first sought a writ.111
Endo asserted that she was “a loyal and law-abiding citizen . . . that no
charge ha[d] been made against her, that she [was] unlawfully detained, and
that she [was] confined . . . under armed guard and held . . . against her
will.”112 The Government conceded that she was both loyal and law-abiding
and made “no claim that she [was] detained on any charge or that she [was]
even suspected of disloyalty.”113 Moreover, the Government conceded that it
was “beyond the power of the War Relocation Authority to detain citizens
against whom no charges of disloyalty or subversiveness had been made for
a period longer than that necessary to separate the loyal from the disloyal and
to provide the necessary guidance for relocation.”114 In essence, the Government’s argument for continued detention following the issuance of leave
clearance was that it was necessary in order to ensure arrangements could be
made for the orderly disposition of those who would be released to carry on
with their lives.115
The Court began its analysis by focusing on the roots of the authority for
WRA detention: Executive Order Number 9066 and the Act of March 12,
1942.116 The Court recognized them for the war measures that they were.117
To interpret and apply them, the Court emphasized that it “must assume that
their purpose was to allow for the greatest possible accommodation between…liberties and the exigencies of war.”118
The Court then noted that both the Order and the Act were expressly intended as measures to protect against sabotage and espionage.119 The Order
“gave as the reason for the exclusion of persons from prescribed military areas the protection of such property ‘against espionage and against

See id. at 285 (“[S]he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of the United
States for the Northern District of California…”).
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 294.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 295.
115 See id. at 296−97.
116 Id. at 298.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 300.
119 Id.
108
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sabotage.’”120 The House report relevant to the Act related that “‘[t]he necessity for this legislation arose from the fact that the safe conduct of the war
requires the fullest possible protection against either espionage or sabotage.’”121 The “[s]ingle aim [of the measures] was the protection of the war
effort against espionage and sabotage.”122
Tellingly, the Court observed that neither the Order nor the Act mentioned
detention.123 Given such silence, the Court said, “[A]ny such authority which
exists must be implied. If there is to be the greatest possible accommodation
of the liberties of the citizen with this war measure, any such implied power
must be narrowly confined to the precise purpose of the evacuation program.”124
The Court then found that there was no nexus between the continued detention of Ms. Endo, a concededly loyal citizen, and the prevention of either
espionage or sabotage.125 In the Court’s language: “[She] who is loyal is by
definition not a spy or saboteur.”126 The justification proffered by the WRA,
i.e. that it was necessary to continue to detain Ms. Endo in order to facilitate
an orderly transition to a life free of such detention, was entirely unrelated to
the prevention of the feared hostile acts.127 Therefore, as the Court put it:
“[w]hen the power to detain is derived from the power to protect the war
effort against espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship to
that objective is unauthorized.”128 The Court's ultimate holding was concise:
“Mitsuye Endo is entitled to an unconditional release by the War Relocation
Authority.”129
Mitsuye Endo’s success before the Supreme Court may have been of cold
comfort. On December 17, 1944, one day before the Court announced its
decision in her case, the Western Defense Command, by then commanded by
Major General Henry C. Platt, issued Public Proclamation Number 21.130 The
proclamation effectively revoked all exclusion orders except those pertaining
to “[t]hose persons concerning whom specific individual exclusion orders
[had] been issued.”131 With this, and with the decision in Endo, conditions
120

Id. at 301.
Id. at 300 (quoting H.R. 1906, 77th Congress (1942)).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 301−02.
125 Id. at 302.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 303.
128 Id. at 302.
129 Id. at 304.
130 Persons of Japanese Ancestry Exemption from Exclusion Orders, 10 Fed. Reg. 53 (Dec. 17, 1944).
131 Id.
121
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were set for the release of almost all those of Japanese ancestry who then
remained in relocation centers. The WRA further announced that its intention
was that “[a]ll relocation centers [would] be closed within a period of six
months to one year[.]”132
III. Post-World War II Congressional Actions
A. The Emergency Detention Act of 1950133
The existential threat which the Axis powers posed to the free world ended
with the unconditional surrender of Germany in May of 1945 followed by
that of Imperial Japan in September of that year.134 But the end of the “hottest” war the world had yet known carried with it the seeds of the so-called
Cold War. Finding in September 1950 the existence of “a world Communist
movement…whose purpose it [was], by . . . espionage, sabotage, . . . and . . .
other means . . . , to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in all the
countries of the world.”135 Congress determined that “[t]he detention of persons who there is reasonable ground to believe probably will commit or conspire with others to commit espionage or sabotage [was], in a time of internal
security emergency, essential to the . . . defense . . . of the United States.”136
Accordingly, Congress passed the Emergency Detention Act (the “EDA”)
which authorized preventive detention by the Executive Branch under defined conditions and subject to considerable procedural protections on the
part of anyone subjected to the Act.137
B. The Non-Detention Act138
Neither President Harry S. Truman nor any of his successors invoked the
EDA.139 Though dormant, it was not forgotten. The cultural, social, and
132

Memorandum from the Dir. of the War Relocation Auth. to Evacuees Resident in Relocation Ctrs. 4
(Jan. 1945) (on file with the National Archives).
133 Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81-831, 64 Stat. 1019.
134 Axis Alliance in World War II, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/axis-alliance-in-world-war-ii (last visited Nov. 8, 2020).
135 Emergency Detention Act § 101(1).
136 Id. at § 101(14).
137 See id. at §§ 102–105, 109–111.
138 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)) (prohibiting
the establishments of detention camps).
139 President Truman opposed passage of the EDA and vetoed it. Congress thereafter overrode the veto.
Vetoes by President Harry S. Truman, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/TrumanHS.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2020). When President Richard M. Nixon signed the EDA, he remarked
that no president had invoked it and that its existence had "aroused concerns...that the act might someday
be used to apprehend and detain citizens who [held] unpopular views." Richard Nixon, President of the
United States, Statement on Signing Bill Repealing the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Sept. 25, 1971)
(transcript available in the University of Michigan Digital Library).
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political unrest of the 1960s fostered anxiety about how the Federal Government might respond to public disorder and helped drive Congressional interest in reexamining the EDA. For example, in 1969, Senator Daniel Inouye
introduced legislation which would repeal the act.140 He wrote the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee on December 4, 1969 stating:
I [am] aware of the widespread rumors circulated throughout our Nation that the
Federal Government was readying concentration camps to be ﬁlled with those
who hold unpopular views and beliefs. These rumors are…believed in many
urban [areas] as well as by those dissidents who are at odds with many of the
policies of the United States. There is a current mood of tension among some
citizens in our land which does not permit these rumors…to be laid to rest. I
believe that the [EDA] stands as a barrier to trust between some of our citizens
and the Government. For these reasons I hope your committee will immediately
141
and favorably consider…my legislation to repeal the [EDA.]

In his own letter to the Committee chair on behalf of the Nixon Administration, Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst invoked the shadows of World War II internments:
[T]he [EDA] has aroused among many of the citizens of the United States the
belief that it may one day be used to accomplish the apprehension and detention
of citizens who hold unpopular beliefs and views. In addition, various groups,
of which our Japanese-American citizens are most prominent, look upon the legislation as permitting a recurrence of the roundups which resulted in the detention
of Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II. It is therefore quite
clear that the continuation of the [EDA] is extremely offensive to many Americans. In the judgment of this Department, the repeal of this legislation will allay
the fears and suspicions - unfounded as they may be - of many of our citizens.
This beneﬁt outweighs any potential advantage which the act may provide in a
time of Internal security emergency. Accordingly, the Department of Justice
142
recommends the repeal of the [EDA].

Congressional efforts to readdress the EDA culminated on September 25,
1971.143 Following debate which included extensive discussion of the need
to avoid a repetition of detentions such as those suffered by Japanese Americans between 1942 and 1945,144 Congress passed Public Law 92-128.145 It
amended 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) to read: “(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or

140

LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22130, DETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENS 3 (2005).
S.R. No. 91-162, at 40702 (1969).
142 U.S. CONG. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., PROHIBITING DETENTION CAMPS: HEARING BEFORE
SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3, at 98 (1971).
143 FISHER, supra note 140, at 1.
144 117 CONG. REC. 31534 (1971).
145 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347-48 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)).
141
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otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”146 It also repealed the EDA in its entirety.147
C. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988148
Continued advocacy to confront the deprivations and losses associated
with the World War II internments, notably by the Japanese American Citizens League,149 spurred Congress to take further action in the 1980s. On July
31, 1980, Congress passed the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act.150 The act established a commission with a charter
“to review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order Number
9066…and the impact of [the] order on American citizens and permanent
resident aliens;” examine the military directives which led to the relocation
and internments; and “recommend appropriate remedies.”151
The Commission submitted its report, Personal Justice Denied, in two
parts: factual matters in December 1982 and recommendations in June
1983.152 In essence, the Commission found that “Executive Order 9066 was
not justified by military necessity, and the decisions that followed from it . .
. were not founded upon military considerations. The broad historical causes
that shaped these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of
political leadership.”153 The Commission made five recommendations: (1)
Congress and the President should acknowledge the grave injustice which
was done and issue a national apology; (2) the President should pardon those
convicted of violating curfews and the Department of Justice should review
other wartime convictions with a view toward recommending appropriate
Presidential pardons; (3) Federal executive agencies should grant liberal consideration to any applications made for the restoration of any positions, status, or entitlements lost as a consequence of exclusion, evacuation and
146

18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
Act of Sept. 25, 1971 § 2(a) (repealing Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. §
811−826)).
148 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903.
149 The League, commonly known by its acronym JACL, succinctly describes itself and its mission on its
website as follows: “Founded in 1929, the JACL is the oldest and largest Asian American civil rights
organization in the United States. The JACL monitors and responds to issues that enhance or threaten the
civil and human rights of all Americans and implements strategies to effect positive social change, particularly to the Asian Pacific American community.” See About: JACL, JAPANESE AM. CITIZENS LEAGUE,
https://jacl.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
150 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Pub. L. No. 96-317, 94 Stat. 964
(1980).
151 Id. at §§ 4(a)(1)–(3), 94 Stat. 964, 965.
152 Personal Justice Denied, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/justice-denied (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
153 JOAN Z. BERSTEIN ET AL., COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1983).
147
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relocation; (4) Congress should establish a fund to support an educational and
humanitarian foundation devoted to preserving the history of the wartime
events and the study of similar denials of civil liberties; and (5) Congress
should appropriate sufficient funds to provide $20,000 in personal redress to
living persons who had suffered exclusion.154
Five years later, Congress acted upon the Commission's recommendations
by passing the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.155 The act included provisions
implementing all five recommendations with no material changes.156 These
included a Statement of Congress containing acknowledgements that “a
grave injustice was done to both citizens and permanent resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians
during World War II,” and that such persons had “suffered enormous damage
[and] significant human suffering for which appropriate compensation has
not been made.”157 Congress then declared, “For these fundamental violations of the basic civil liberties and constitutional rights of these individuals
of Japanese ancestry, the Congress apologizes on behalf of the Nation.”158
When President Ronald Regan signed the act he stated, “[W]e gather here
today to right a grave wrong. [W]e admit a wrong; here we reaffirm our commitment as a nation to equal justice under the law.”159
IV. A Dangerous Legacy - The Continued Vitality of Hirabayashi,
Korematsu, and Endo
The passage of time, the perception of lessening threats, legislative
changes, the documentation of, acknowledgement of, and apology for
wrongs, the vacation of convictions, along with token compensation, may
have helped cause the reality of World War II executive detentions to fade in
the collective national memory. But a conclusion that the legal underpinnings
154

Id. at 8−10.
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903.
156 The Commission recommended that Congress appropriate $1.5 billion to fund personal redress payments. BERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 153, at 9. In the Act, Congress authorized $1.25 billion for this
purpose. Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 104(e). Congress did, however, extend eligibility for payments to
select heirs of former internees who died before payment could be made to them. Id. at § 105(a)(7).
157 Id. at § 2(a).
158 Id.
159 Ronald Regan, President of the United States, Remarks on Signing the Bill Providing Restitution for
the Wartime Internment of Japanese-American Civilians (Aug. 10, 1998) (transcript available at the
Ronald Reagan Presidential Libr. & Museum). Among many notable milestones of the campaign to right
wrongs was the eventual vacation of the criminal convictions of Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu. In
the mid-1980s, all three men prevailed in cases they brought seeking writs of coram nobis. See Hirabayashi
v. United States, 627 F.Supp. 1445, 1457−58 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (vacating one conviction and upholding
another); United States v. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987) (vacating both convictions
against Hirabayashi); Yasui v. United States, 772 F. 2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United
States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
155
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of such detentions have been effectively overruled or amended away is ill
founded. Instead, careful analysis suggests that a number of other conclusions
are warranted.
A. Executive Detention can be a Legitimate Exercise of the War
Power.
Some of what the World War II era cases stand for is clearly gone. Their
darkest aspect was their explicit reliance upon racial stereotypes to justify
profound deprivation of liberties.160 Fortunately, such irrational bases for
governmental action could not now be sustained. Brown v. Board of Education161 long ago condemned the practice of denying educational opportunities
to public school students based solely upon their race.162 The Court later invoked both Hirabayashi and Korematsu when it decided Loving v. Virginia.163 It recalled Hirabayashi's dictum that “‘[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ [were] ‘odious . . . to . . . equality.’”164
It cited Korematsu favorably for the proposition that “‘the Equal Protection
Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the “most rigid scrutiny[.]”’”165 The Loving Court famously went on to hold that “[t]here can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”166 While both Brown and Loving
addressed and vindicated key liberty interests, i.e., education and marriage,
they did not address liberty in its essence, which is “freedom from physical
restraint.”167 Should the Court be asked today to sustain the deprivation of
that most basic liberty, in the form of executive detention based solely upon
racial distinctions or classifications, there can likewise be no doubt that it
would find a glaring Constitutional violation.
If, however, the World War II cases are stripped of their racial odium,
much of their substance remains undisturbed. All other considerations aside,
the Court has not to date directly encountered their equivalents since they
were decided and hence has had no formal opportunity to authoritatively reverse them. Trump v. Hawaii168 did not present such an opportunity as it did
160

See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 217−19 (1944).
161 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162 See id. at 495 (holding that racial segregation in education was unconstitutional).
163 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
164 Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
165 Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S., 214, 217−19 (1944)).
166 Id. at 12.
167 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 725–26 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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not examine restraints upon the liberties of Americans subject to wartime
executive detention measures. It dealt instead with “ . . . whether the President
had authority under the [Immigration and Nationality] Act to issue [a] Proclamation, and whether the entry policy [announced in the Proclamation] violate[d] the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”169 The Proclamation “…impose[d] entry restrictions on nationals of countries that do not
share adequate information for an informed entry determination, or that otherwise present national security risks.”170 As dicta, Chief Justice Robert's
observation that Trump overruled Korematsu was limited in its jurisdictional
reach to “the court of history”171 rather than serving as binding legal precedent among the nine current or future justices of the Supreme Court. Justices
Sotomayor’s and Ginsburg’s assertion in their dissent “that the Court [had
taken] the important step of finally overruling Korematsu”172 was thus overblown.
The critical remnant from World War II cases is what they have to say
about the war powers of the political branches. It is true enough that in the
cases the Supreme Court did not face any litigant who was a traitor, spy,
saboteur, or who was otherwise disloyal to the U.S. But that does not detract
from the authority of the Government—and what the cases said about that
authority—to address persons who actually do constitute such threats.
Justice Stone, from the dusty pages of Hirabayashi, still tells us that “The
war power . . . is ‘the power to wage war successfully’ [and] extends to every
matter and activity [that] substantially . . . affect[s] its conduct and progress.”173 Further, that power allows for broad “judgment and discretion in .
. . the selection of the means” of waging war.174 The Court found that the
imposition of restraint associated with a curfew was a constitutionally permissible exercise of the discretion allowed under the war power.175 If, in the
future, a given curfew is in fact rationally based, it may very well be deemed
a legitimate exercise of the war power— however irrational the curfew was
in actuality against a guileless Kiyoshi Hirabayashi.
Fred Korematsu never plotted the destruction of defense plants. But Justice Black still speaks down through the years that “the gravest imminent
danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify [curfews and
169

Id. at 2403.
Id.
171 Id. at 2423.
172 Id. at 2448 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (quoting Charles E. Hughes, War Powers Under
the Constitution, 40 ANNU. REP. AM. B. ASS’N 232, 238 (1917)).
174 Id.
175 Id. at 92, 102.
170
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exclusions]” so long as they bear “a definite and close relationship to the
prevention of [wartime] espionage and sabotage.”176
For over two years, Mitsuye Endo, a concededly loyal American, languished in harsh desert camps while she patiently litigated the lawfulness of
her detention.177 The ghost of Justice Douglas continues to whisper, “[w]hen
the power to detain is derived from the power to protect the war effort against
espionage and sabotage, detention which has no relationship to that objective
is unauthorized.”178 But if one listens carefully, one will also hear it utter
that, given the war power, Endo “does not, of course, mean that any power
to detain is lacking.”179
More recent cases reinforce and buttress the reality of the war power as it
relates to executive detention. In Rasul v. Bush,180 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,181
Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld,182 and Boumediene v. Bush,183 the Supreme Court expounded procedural protections due to persons detained as enemy combatants by the U.S. at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.184
Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was believed to have fought with Taliban forces in
Afghanistan following the U.S. invasion of that country in 2001.185 He alleged that his detention was in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.186 Justice O’Connor, author of the plurality opinion, articulated a central question as “[w]hether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens
who qualify as ‘enemy combatants.’”187 The plurality ultimately found that
176

Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944).
See Stephanie Buck, Overlooked No More: Mitsuye Endo, a Name Linked to Justice for JapaneseAmericans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/obituaries/mitsuye-endooverlooked.html.
178 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
179 Id. at 301.
180 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
181 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
182 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
183 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
184 A primary issue in each of the cases was the extent to which the detainees enjoyed the right to habeas
corpus review of their detention. Rasul found it as a matter of statutory right, even for non-citizens. Rasul,
542 U.S. at 484. Hamdi reiterated that it always applies to citizens. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525. Hamdan
found that federal courts retained habeas jurisdiction despite a Congressional attempt to withdraw it.
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 584. Finally, Boumediene held that habeas extended to noncitizens held at the Naval
Station as a matter of constitutional right. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
185 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
186 Id. at 511.
187 The plurality limited the reach of its opinion to enemy combatants as that term was defined by the
Government for the purposes of the case, that is, persons who were “part of or supporting forces hostile
to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States.” Id. at 516. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined Justice
O’Connor. Id. at 508. Justice Souter authored a separate opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, in which he
177
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authority in the guise of the Authorization for Use of Military Force (the
“AMUF”)188 by which Congress granted President George W. Bush authority “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001[.]”189 Justice
O'Connor concluded that “detention of [enemy combatants] . . . is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary
and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”190 The
plurality also found that there was “no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its
own citizens as an enemy combatant.”191
While he concurred with the plurality’s judgment, Justice Souter was unwilling to find, in general, that the AUMF authorized Hamdi’s detention,192
but acknowledged one argument for it to be considered as approval: that the
AUMF empowered “the military and its Commander in Chief …to deal with
enemy belligerents according to the treaties and customs known collectively
as the laws of war.”193
The ultimate question in Boumediene was ‘whether [non-citizen petitioners had] the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be
withdrawn except in conformance with the Suspension Clause[.]”194 The
Court held in the affirmative as to this issue.195 But the Court tempered its
holding by forthrightly acknowledging the robust character of the war power.
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that “[i]n considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of
concurred in part, dissented in part, but concurred with the Court’s judgment. Id. at 539.
188 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 1541 (2001)).
189 Id.
190 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
191 Id. at 519. The Court relied in part on Ex parte Quirin in setting forth its proposition. The Quirin case
reviewed the trial by military commission of eight German agents who were apprehended in the U.S. in
1942. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18, 21 (1942). They had been trained in Germany as saboteurs, transported to America via German submarines, and landed here at locations on the east coast. Id. at 21. One
of them, Herbert Hans Haupt, maintained that he was a naturalized U.S. citizen. Id. at 20. The Court in
Quirin affirmed the convictions, as well as the capital sentences of Haupt and several of his fellow agents.
Id. at 48. Justice O’Connor wrote that in Quirin “[w]e held that ‘[c]itizens who associate themselves with
the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent
on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war.’” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519
(citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942)). Justice O’Connor observed that “[w]hile Haupt was
tried for violations of the law of war, nothing in Quirin suggests that his citizenship would have precluded
his mere detention for the duration of there levant hostilities.” Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30–
31 (1942)).
192 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 548 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
194 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
195 Id.
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terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political branches”196
and “[t]he law must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend
and detain those who pose a real danger to our security.”197 And of everything in the cases from the two different eras regarding the war powers, no
comment is perhaps more significant than this by Justice Kennedy: “[I]t has
been [thus far] possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined.”198
In truth, the outer boundaries of the war powers do remain undefined. Yet,
the Court has thus far left squarely within those otherwise ill-defined borders
readily available authority for a President to employ executive detentions.
When ridded of its irrational raced-based distinctions, Hirabayashi still
stands as authority for rationally based curfews as a wartime security measure.199 Korematsu, similarly purged, still holds that exclusion from specified
areas can be sustained on similar grounds. 200 Endo does not bar the executive
detention of persons, regardless of citizenship, if they can be legitimately
determined to pose clear and present dangers to national security.201 Hamdi
establishes that U.S. citizens, properly classified as enemy combatants, may
lawfully be subjected to executive detention as an incident of war.202 Lastly,
Boumediene, which suffers from none of the deserved taint of the World War
II era cases, is a contemporary reminder that judicial deference is still due to
an Executive possessed of “substantial authority to apprehend and detain
those who pose a real danger to our security.”203
In the absence of more definitive margins to the war power, the detention
cases collectively remain an open invitation to the political branches to define
the limits for themselves.
B. The Non-Detention Act is a Thin Shield against Executive
Detention

The Non-Detention Act (the “NDA”) invoked the memory of the
detention of Japanese Americans and sought to prevent similar events
after its passage.204 In effect, however, all the NDA did was to require

196

Id. at 796–97 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319–20 (1936)).
197 Id. at 797 (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 797–98.
199 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943).
200 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944).
201 See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297, 301–302 (1944).
202 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19 (2004).
203 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797.
204 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347, 348.
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that Congress sanction future detentions in its own right.205 As laudable as Congressional motives may have been in 1971, it must not be
forgotten that Congress itself approved the World War II detentions
when it passed the act of March 21, 1942,206 well before most of those
who would be detained would look out upon America from within the
wire surrounding a relocation center.207
The Hamdi decision illustrates that Congressional sanction of wartime detentions can still take similar form. Hamdi argued that the President lacked authority to detain him, citing the NDA.208 Relying upon
§4001(a) which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress[,]” Hamdi’s position was essentially that Congress had passed no
act authorizing the type of detention to which he was subject.209 Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer, four
of the five members of the Court who produced a plurality opinion,
were satisfied that the AUMF explicitly authorized detention of
Hamdi—a U.S. citizen—in the face of his Non-Detention Act challenge. As Justice O'Connor wrote:
[W]e conclude that the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow category we describe (assuming, without deciding, that such authorization is required), and that the AUMF satisfied
§4001(a)’s requirement that a detention be 'pursuant to an Act of Congress' (as210
suming, without deciding, that §4001(a) applies to military detentions).

In other words, the four justices were content that the AUMF, which approved “‘all necessary and appropriate force,’” also approved the detention
of Hamdi as “a fundamental and accepted . . . incident to war” during a war
Congress authorized the President to wage.211 To the extent, then, that detention of persons who can be proven to constitute imminent security threats can
be construed as a fundamental incident of war, and thus of the war power, the
requirements of NDA may well be satisfied by a general Congressional approval of Presidential resort to that power.
Such approval could be found in a declaration of war. Article I, Section 8,
Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the sole authority to

205

See id.
Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173.
207 See DEWITT, supra note 21, at 279, 282−84.
208 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
209 Id.
210 Id. (emphasis added).
211 Id. at 518.
206
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declare war.212 Though it has this authority, Congress has long since proven
unwilling or incapable of assuming the political responsibility for its exercise. The last time it invoked its authority was early in the United States’
involvement in World War II, when on June 5, 1942, it declared war against
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.213 Future declarations seem unlikely.
Some Congressional reluctance is understandable given international developments since 1945. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States,
along with most of the other nations of the world, committed to “refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”214
It can be argued, however, that it is equally, if not more likely, that Congress has refrained from using its authority due to domestic political considerations. Since World War II, Congress has commonly chosen to approve the
use of military force—the waging of war in all practical senses— through
resolutions akin to the AUMF.215 Half measures when compared to declarations of war, such resolutions on the one hand represent Congressional approval of the use of force by the President, but on the other provide a measure
of political cover should Congress subsequently develop a mind to criticize
how the President pursues a war it authorized.
The historical reluctance of Congress to assume a more proactive role in
how the nation resorts to military force represents its own form of deference
to the Executive. A deferential or pliant legislative branch may content itself
to remain silent regarding the constraints of the EDA, referencing it in neither
authorizations nor any future declarations of war. Or it might otherwise refrain from reinforcing it should a President affirmatively test its limits—and
simply await the political fallout of such a test.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water[.]”).
213 H.R.J. Res. 319, Pub. L. No. 77-563, 56 Stat. 307 (1942); H.R.J. Res. 320, Pub. L. No. 77-564, 56 Stat.
307 (1942); H.R.J. Res. 321, Pub. L. No. 77-565, 56 Stat. 307 (1942).
214 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
215 The Joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia
was the so called “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” which authorized President Lyndon Johnson “to take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression.” H.R.J. Res. 1145, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). It served as the legal basis for the
subsequent broad scale engagement of the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, HISTORY
(June 7, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/gulf-of-tonkin-resolution-1. The Joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council
Resolution 678 provided the legal authority for the President George H.W. Bush to commit U.S. forces in
the Gulf War against Iraq. H.R.J. Res. 77, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3,4 (1991); Stephen Knott, George
H. W. Bush: Foreign Affairs, MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs (last
visited Nov. 12, 2020).
212
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The relative passivity of Congress has left a state of affairs wherein it is
quite possible that leaders “of wisdom and of reach, with windlasses and with
assays of bias, by indirections [may] find directions out[.]”216 In other words,
as did Justice O’Connor and those who joined her, a future President and a
future Court might find sufficient explicit Congressional sanction for executive detentions indirectly rather than directly. Under the strain of a future national security crisis, the Non-Detention Act, as it is currently written, may
thus prove to be an easily penetrated shield.
V. The Bases for Executive Detention and the Proof Required to
Sustain it Remain Matters of Broad Discretion by the Political
Branches
The detentions and other constraints on liberty of 1942 to 1945 were putatively justified as measures meant to protect against sabotage and espionage.217 However, none of the cases that reached the Supreme Court purported to establish a standard of proof or a procedure by which a person might
be determined to be an actual potential spy or saboteur.218 On the other hand,
none of them stand for the proposition that appropriate definitions, standards
of proof, and procedures, to support detentions could not be developed. Indeed, the essence of Endo, the case which dealt most directly with long term
detention, is that a “concededly loyal” American could not be subjected to
detention— not “that any power to detain [was] lacking.”219
The post 9/11 cases are no barrier to the development of standards either.
They all involved persons who at some point had been designated as enemy
combatants and who thus threatened security.220 But the Court did little to
elaborate on what that term meant, nor did it ever materially question the
authority of the Executive to define the term and then rely upon it. Justice
O’Connor observed in Hamdi that while “the Government [had] never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals” as
combatants, but:
[i]t [had] made clear… that, for purposes of this case, the ‘enemy combatant’ that
it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was ‘part of or supporting

216

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 2, sc. 1., l. 69.
Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1,407 (Feb. 25, 1942).
218 See e.g. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538–39
(2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).
219 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 301 (1944).
220 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–71; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–11; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 570; Boumediene, 553
U.S. at 734.
217
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forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan and who
221
‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’

The Court was content to use that definition to resolve the case.222
Following the decision in Hamdi, the Department of Defense publicly defined the term in an order issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz on July 7, 2004.223 As the order provided, an enemy combatant was
“an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces.”224 Thus, the definition was essentially what the Court accepted in
Hamdi.
The Court in Boumediene v. Bush likewise supplied no further insight regarding the character or limits of the definition. It made but two references
and both were passing remarks to it “as the Department of Defense defines
that term.”225 In the end, the Court made clear that it affirmatively declined
to address the substance of standards regarding who might be subjected to
executive detention. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Boumediene, “[i]t bears
repeating that our opinion does not address the content of the law that governs
petitioners’ detention.”226 The Court likewise refrained from any attempt to
quantify a burden of proof, remarking instead: “The extent of the showing
required of the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined.”227
In the presence of such a vacuum, the President and/or Congress are left
with potentially broad discretion to define who and what might threaten national security and how such threats may be proven. After the attacks of 9/11,
the President effectively did so with regard to the unprivileged belligerents
he chose to call “enemy combatants” in order to detain those who had been
captured and thus “prevent [their] return to the battlefield [all as] a fundamental incident of waging war.”228

221

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516.
Id. (“We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling
within that definition is authorized.”).
223 Letter from the Deputy Sec’y of Defense to the Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004) (on file with the Dep’t
of Defense).
224 Id.
225 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733, 788.
226 Id. at 798.
227 Id. at 787.
228 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
222
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Combatants, privileged or otherwise, are obviously not the only persons
who can pose imminent threats to national security in times of war.229 Nothing in the detention cases prevents the political branches from developing
appropriately tailored, rational, and justly drawn standards addressing such
threats should they be posed by non-combatant U.S. citizens or others. An
invitation to do so, likewise, remains open.
VI. Filling the Vacuum - A Recommendation for Legislation
Whether by chance, luck, fate, or the steady ebb and flow of history itself,
the U.S. has been spared from executive detentions like those imposed during
World War II. The boldest step in the direction of detention was likely the
passage of the Emergency Detention Act,230 which was repealed nearly 50
years ago.231
Yet the very instrument of that repeal, the Non-Detention Act, when
viewed in the stark light of the war power authorities which remain from the
World War II cases, further brightened by those indicated in the cases from
the era of the so called Global War on Terror, continues to help prop open
the door to potentially broad based executive detention.232 That door can be
closed.
If the will of Congress is that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to”233 an explicit act of its own,
it should amend 8 U.S.C. § 4001 to foreclose the possibility that either a declaration of war or a Congressional authorization for the use of military force,
standing alone, constitute the required act. Such an amendment could take
this form:

229

Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV), Annex to the Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. 539 (“The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions: (1) To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (2) To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; (3) To carry arms openly;
and (4) To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war . . . In countries where
militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they are included under the denomination
'army’ . . . The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy,
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves
in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect
the laws and customs of war . . . The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants
and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of
war.”). Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949 (noting similar
provisions exist in Article 4 of convention).
230 Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 1019.
231 Act of Sept. 25, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, § 2(a), 85 Stat. 347–48 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 811–826)
(repealing the Emergency Detention Act of 1950).
232 Id. at § 2(a), 85 Stat. 348.
233 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a).
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Unless imprisonment or detention of citizens is expressly authorized by Congress
as an incident of war in the text of a Declaration of War made by Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the U.S. Constitution or in the text of
any authorization to use military force, neither said Declaration nor authorization
constitutes an Act of Congress for purposes of this section.

In order to accommodate the vital need during military operations to capture, control, and detain enemy belligerents, whether privileged or unprivileged, Congress could further provide:
Nothing in this section prevents the detention or imprisonment of any person,
regardless of citizenship, who is either a privileged or unprivileged belligerent
under the Law of Armed Conflict as defined by custom, practice, treaty, convention, or other international agreement, including, but not limited to, Laws and
Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) and the Geneva Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

To accommodate potential U.S. specific national preferences or practices,
Congress could also include language which excluded belligerents defined in
a manner consistent with how the Department of Defense has described "enemy combatants."234
Presidents could perceive that amendments of this nature would intrude
upon the war making prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief235 and thus,
represent an unconstitutional breach of the principle of separation of powers.
Should such Congressional amendments be enacted, and should such a Presidential challenge be made, the Court might be confronted with a reality about
which Justice Kennedy cautioned in Boumediene, i.e. that in the future “ . . .
the Court might not have the luxury” “to leave the outer boundaries of war
powers undefined.”236
CONCLUSION
This paper does not advocate resorting to preventive executive detention
as a means of fostering national security. It is meant, instead, as a caution that
both history and the law have left more latitude for resort to such detention
than might meet the common eye. A studied reading of that history, including
the Supreme Court cases that are part of it, reveals authorities upon which the
machinery for executive detention can be built or rebuilt. Those authorities
stand for the proposition that however irrational and unjust were the detentions of World War II, it is possible to conduct executive detentions, even on
a broad scale, if they are administered justly.
Letter from the Deputy Sec’y of Defense to the Sec’y of the Navy, supra note 223.
Id.
236 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
234
235
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Whether it would be prudent to do so is another a question. The statutory
changes identified herein could be a substantial step toward better insulating
the nation from the prospect of future deprivations of liberty and perhaps help
foster greater prudence in matters of such tremendous consequence as the
wartime detention of American citizens.
The World War II executive detention of Japanese Americans arose in an
environment comprised of several distinct and recognizable elements. The
first was a perceived existential threat which burst from Hawaiian skies on
that Sunday morning of nearly 80 years ago.
Three additional elements entered the mix: an aggressive executive in the
guise of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a pliant Congress, and ultimately,
a deferential Supreme Court. The detention of 110,000 persons of Japanese
ancestry could not have happened but for the interaction and cooperation of
all three branches of the U.S. Government.237
There was a fifth element as well: the American public. That public was
stoked by the fear brought on by the first element and fired by an unfortunate
capacity to harbor racial animus.238 It was a public that yielded, to paraphrase
Abraham Lincoln—another war time president—to the lesser angels of its
nature.239
The World War II cases can be likened to the unexploded ordnance which,
to this day, is regularly found around the globe, in the fields, seas, and cities
where the war was waged.240 The cases lurk like rusty bombs, still laden with
high explosives. They wait— and if disturbed— they can function in a manner consistent with their design. Neither the President, the Congress, nor the
Courts have defused them despite remorse, apologies, statutes, compensation, decisions, etc.
They may be seemingly buried amid the long-cooled ashes of a long ago
won war. Yet absent material legislative changes, or binding changes in the
Court's interpretation of law and the Constitution, the cases remain
237

See Japanese Internment Bill, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Records-and-Research/Listing/lfp_004/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2020) (noting actions taken by Executive and Legislative
Branches); Facts and Case Summary – Korematsu v. U.S., U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educational-activities/facts-and-case-summary-korematsu-v-us (last visited Nov. 8,
2020) (noting actions taken by Judicial Branch).
238 See PRANGE, supra note 11, at 561, 582.
239 Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861) (on file with
the Libr. of Cong.) (“The mystic chords of memorys (sic), stretching (sic) from every battlefield, and
patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of
the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.”).
240 See, e.g., German bomb experts defuse WWII-era bomb in Frankfurt, AP NEWS (June 5, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/41eed85258163cbe5325da9699c617c6 (noting that a 500 kilogram bomb was
found on a construction site).

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2021

31

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
Do Not Delete

58

5/13/2021 5:49 PM

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIV:ii

nonetheless dangerous. Almost exactly two years before he died,241 Justice
Antonin Scalia was asked for his thoughts about Korematsu. He replied that
it was wrong, though he added: "[b]ut you are kidding yourself if you think
the same thing will not happen again[.]”242
The elements, which combined to produce the World War II detentions,
are never far from hand. In an increasingly disordered and dangerous world,
existential threats may reveal themselves in sudden and shocking ways. The
nation may look to an aggressive executive for leadership in a time of crisis.
Congress may grow remarkably pliant as it bends to political winds which
blow fiercely, sounding deeply in their roar for protection and retribution. A
Court, which has left ample room for maneuver, may again prove deferential.
And a public may be willing to suffer that some Americans lose their liberty
in the hope of gaining security for others.
Under such circumstances, pressure on the trigger could, again, fire the
weapon.

241

Justice Scalia passed away in Texas on February 13, 2016. See David G. Savage, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia dies at 79; ardent conservative fought liberalism’s tide, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-antonin-scalia-20160213-story.html.
242 Ilya Somin, Justice Scalia on Kelo and Korematsu, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/08/justice-scalia-on-kelo-and-korematsu/.
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